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Abstract
Since the discovery of motor mirroring, the involvement of the motor system in action 
interpretation has been widely discussed. While some theories proposed that motor mirroring 
underlies human action understanding, others suggested that it is a corollary of action 
interpretation. We put these two accounts to the test by employing superficially similar 
actions that invite radically different interpretations of the underlying intentions. Using an 
action-observation task, we assessed motor activation (as indexed by the suppression of the 
EEG mu rhythm) in response to actions typically interpreted as instrumental (e.g., grasping) 
or referential (e.g., pointing) towards an object. Only the observation of instrumental actions 
resulted in enhanced mu suppression. In addition, the exposure to grasping actions failed to 
elicit mu suppression when they were preceded by speech, suggesting that the presence of 
communicative signals modulated the interpretation of the observed actions. These results 
suggest that the involvement of sensorimotor cortices during action processing is conditional 
on a particular (instrumental) action interpretation, and that action interpretation relies on 
inferential processes and top-down mechanisms that are implemented outside of the motor 
system. 
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Highlights:
- The observation of grasping, but not of pointing, activates the motor system.
- Action interpretation is modulated by the presence of communicative signals.
- Motor mirroring is the consequence, rather than the source, of action interpretation.
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal reports that neurons in the macaque premotor cortex are active not 
only when the animal executes certain movements, but also when it observes these 
movements executed by someone else (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996), a 
range of evidence has demonstrated that similar phenomena of action mirroring occur also in 
other animal species (e.g., Keller & Hahnloser, 2009; Prather et al., 2008), including humans 
(e.g., Buccino et al., 2004; Grèzes et al., 2003, for human infants, see Southgate et al., 2009). 
A widely accepted theory of the cognitive function of motor mirroring proposes that this 
mechanism enables observers to understand actions performed by other individuals (mirror-
based account of action understanding, for a review, see Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2011). 
Importantly, according to this account, goal attribution is achieved by the observer through 
simulation of witnessed actions in her own motor system, without engaging in any inferential 
processes (i.e., direct matching, Rizolatti et al., 2001; Gallese et al., 2004). That is, action 
observation triggers in the brain of the observer motor programs similar to those generated 
when she executes her own actions, whose goals she has direct access to and can thus use this 
knowledge to extrapolate the goals that guide the behavior of others.
Alternatively, it has been proposed that the involvement of the motor system in action 
processing might not necessarily be due to the fact that motor mirroring provides bottom-up 
support for action understanding. Rather, mirroring might be generated in a top-down manner 
as a result of action interpretation, reflecting processes involved in the reconstruction and 
tracking of how ongoing actions unfold (action-reconstruction account of action 
understanding, Csibra, 2007; see also Hickok, 2013; Jacob, 2008; Prinz, 2006) or in the 
preparation of responses to the actions of other social agents (social responding theory of 
motor mirroring, Hamilton, 2013; Sartori et al., 2013). To date, empirical evidence that could 
discriminate between these two theoretical approaches remains scarce despite the relevance 
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of this controversy to our understanding of action processing mechanisms and social 
cognition. 
In order to determine whether motor mirroring is a prerequisite or an outcome of 
action interpretation it might be helpful to distinguish between instrumental and 
communicative actions. Such a distinction has proven useful to account for sophisticated 
action interpretation abilities documented in preverbal human infants (for reviews, see 
Csibra, 2003; Woodward, 2009), and, more specifically, to explain how the understanding of 
others' actions might be possible without the attribution of mental states (beliefs, intentions, 
desires). It was suggested that human infants are equipped with two functionally distinct 
action interpretation systems, instrumental and referential (Csibra, 2003), allowing them to 
make sense of witnessed behaviors without taking a general-purpose intentional stance 
(Dennett, 1987). These two systems represent two interpretational strategies that are designed 
to fulfill different functions: interpreting goal-directed actions, on one hand, and interpreting 
communication, on the other hand (Csibra, 2003; for a different version, see Gergely & 
Jacob, 2012). Each of these systems is characterized by a specific set of representations and 
computations, which result in radically different conceptualizations of witnessed events and 
support different kinds of inferences.
First, the teleological action interpretation system enables human infants to construe 
observed actions as instrumental in bringing about certain goal states (e.g., to retrieve a ball) 
and to draw a number of inferences that are made possible by such understanding of 
witnessed events (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Specifically, infants are able to evaluate which of 
the actions that are available to the agent is the most efficient means to achieve its goal (e.g., 
which path is the most direct to reach a particular location, Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al., 
1995; Skerry et al., 2013) and they expect agents to select such efficient means to achieve 
their goals (e.g., not to make unnecessary detours while moving toward a location, Csibra, 
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2008). Infants also succeed at inferring goals before the observed actions are completed (e.g., 
Csibra et al., 2003; Daum et al., 2008; Southgate & Csibra, 2009; Wagner & Carey, 2005). 
Second, the referential action interpretation system biases observers to construe 
witnessed behaviors as highlighting those aspects of the world that are linked to the contents 
of a communicated message. The result of such interpretation is a shift of attentional focus 
from the action itself toward objects or events singled out by the action (e.g., through 
pointing or a gaze shift) and selected by the actor to become the deictic referent of a 
communicative exchange. Infants expect actions interpreted as referential to be object-
directed (Csibra & Volein, 2008; Gredebäck et al., 2010), and to be consistent with each other 
when concurrently produced by the same person (Gliga & Csibra, 2009).
Teleological and referential action interpretation systems operate independently from 
each other and have different criteria of application, whose satisfaction, and thus the 
activation of a particular action interpretation at any given time, depends on the applicability 
of certain inferential schemas to the witnessed behaviors (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Judging 
the observed action as being an efficient means towards its goal is consistent with the 
teleological stance, while the presence of ostensive signals that indicate communicative 
intentions of the actor (Csibra, 2010) elicits the expectation for referential actions. Besides 
taking rich inferential routes that start with the satisfaction of generic input conditions of the 
two action interpretation systems, action understanding can also be achieved by relying on 
the strong associative links that are formed between frequently occurring actions and their 
effects (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Elsner, 2007). This applies, for example, in the case of 
conventionalized gestures, such as pointing, which are immediately interpreted as 
communicative in the absence of further evidence. 
Interestingly, the competing accounts of motor mirroring described above make 
opposite predictions for the interpretation of such communicative behaviors. Theories of 
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mirror-based action understanding claim that action interpretation is driven by action 
simulation. Therefore, the observer’s motor system should be recruited for all kinds of 
actions that are part of her motor repertoire. In contrast, theories denying a causal role of 
motor mirroring in action understanding should allow more nuanced predictions. For 
example, it should be predicted that the involvement of the observer’s motor system might 
differ depending on the interpretation of the observed action (e.g., whether it is instrumental 
or communicative, according to the action-reconstruction framework, Csibra, 2007; whether 
it requires a response or not, according to the social responding framework, Hamilton, 2013). 
In particular, the action-reconstruction account posits that motor simulation serves 
action monitoring and action prediction. That is, by engaging motor programs leading to the 
hypothesized outcome of the witnessed action, the observer examines whether their expected 
perceptual effect matches the observed movement. Thus, mirroring processes should be 
reliably in place when observers witness instrumental actions directed at realizing particular 
behavioral goals. However, such action monitoring is not required in the case of referential 
actions that are performed to direct the observer’s attention towards objects and events that 
could be referents of the ongoing communication. While at the level of inferences, both types 
of action interpretation return the partial contents of the actor’s intentions (i.e., desired end 
states and to-be-communicated information, respectively), and, at the level of perceptual 
analysis, both types of actions can be conceived as transitive object-directed movements 
(e.g., grasping and pointing, respectively), the links between these levels of representation are 
formed by different mechanisms (i.e., assessment of action efficiency and recognition of 
communicative intentions, respectively). Accordingly, different neural systems might be 
involved in processing actions that were given these two types of interpretation, with a 
stronger involvement of the motor system in response to actions construed as instrumental 
and requiring motor emulation of hypothesized goals than in response to actions construed as 
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communicative and requiring the identification of those aspects of the environment that will 
be target of the communicative exchange. Thus, the directionality of causal connections 
between motor mirroring and action understanding can be tested by comparing the levels of 
motor activity across instrumental and communicative actions. If a particular kind of action 
interpretation is a prerequisite for the engagement of the observer’s motor system, then the 
selected interpretation should directly modulate the level of motor activation.
Observation of transitive goal-directed actions often elicits stronger motor mirroring 
than observation of intransitive actions (e.g., Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004). However, the 
neural mechanisms involved in interpreting transitive referential actions remain largely 
unexplored (but see Andric et al., 2013; Pierno et al., 2009). Some evidence for the causal 
role of action interpretation in motor mirroring comes from research exploring motor 
activation during observation of actions with no clear goals. For example, reaching behind an 
occluder elicits motor activation in monkeys when the animals know that there is an object 
placed behind the occluder; yet, the same reaching movements do not result in a mirroring 
response when the animals know that no object is there (Umiltà et al., 2001). Similarly, 
human infants display mu suppression while watching a hand reaching behind an occluder, 
but not when a matching action is performed with the back of the hand (Southgate et al., 
2010). Finally, in human adults motor activation is higher for actions with obvious goals 
relative to actions whose goals are not straightforward to understand (e.g., Chaminade et al., 
2001; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003). On the basis of these results, one could argue that it is 
transitivity (object-directedness), rather than interpretation of goal-directedness, that elicits or 
facilitates motor mirroring of observed actions. Direct comparison of transitive object-direct 
actions that invite radically different interpretations, such as grasping, which is instrumental 
to retrieving an object, and pointing, which aims at sharing some information about an object, 
would allow us to address this objection. 
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The current study was designed to investigate whether action interpretation requires 
the involvement of the motor system by directly contrasting motor activation in response to 
observing different types of actions that share formal characteristics, such as transitivity and 
object-directedness, and whose interpretation is easily accessible to human adults.  We 
contrasted these particular actions because they are typically interpreted as instrumental (i.e., 
grasping, reaching, e.g., Woodward, 1998; Yoon et al., 2008) or referential and 
communicative (i.e., pointing, e.g., Kita, 2008) since early in ontogeny. Although the exact 
kinematics (e.g., Marteniuk et al., 1987; Carnahan et al. 1993; Castiello, 2001) and neural 
bases underlying the production  of these actions (Grafton et al., 1996) differ, all are object-
directed (transitive) and have comparable trajectory of movement that is available for 
mirroring to human adults. To assess motor activation, we measured the mu rhythm (also 
known as the resting state sensorimotor alpha rhythm, 8-12 Hz) through 
electroencephalography (EEG). Attenuation (or suppression) of this rhythm is typically 
observed while participants execute movements or observe biological movements executed 
by others (e.g., Babiloni et al., 1999; Hari et al., 1998; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004) and 
is considered to reflect the activation of the sensorimotor cortex (Arnstein et al., 2011; Hari & 
Salmelin, 1997). If the recruitment of the sensorimotor system during action processing is 
conditional on instrumental action interpretation, mu suppression should be observed only in 
response to grasping and reaching, but not in response to pointing.
However, it should be acknowledged that different levels of mu suppression during 
observation of grasping, reaching, and pointing actions could in principle result not from 
differences in action interpretation, but from the fact that the motor system is more strongly 
engaged in response to actions that require prehension and more precise motor planning (e.g., 
to adjust the shape of the hand to the particular target object) than in response to simple 
pointing actions that require little or no adjustment to the environment. Such is the case 
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during execution of hand actions: more brain areas are recruited while participants conduct a 
precision grip relative to a power grip (Begliomini et al., 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2000). To 
ensure that our results are not by-products of the larger neural population involved in 
processing prehensile actions, we introduced an additional experimental manipulation: 
participants were presented with speech (Look!) or a matched pure tone prior to the onset of 
the action. Our rationale was that the presence of communicative signals would bias 
participants to suppress the instrumental interpretation of the observed acts (and/or construe 
them as referential), even though the same sequences of movements might not elicit this 
interpretation outside of communicative contexts. Under this assumption, identical grasping 
actions should be interpreted differently depending on the preceding sound stimuli, thus 
affecting levels of motor activation. Specifically, if the presence of speech changes the 
interpretation of grasping from instrumental to referential, less mu suppression should be 
recorded in the presence of speech than in the presence of a pure tone. These predictions were 
tested across two experiments that differed solely with respect to how the experimental trials 
were blocked for presentation: in Experiment 1 trials were blocked by sound and action, 
while in Experiment 2 trials were blocked only by sound. Thus, while in Experiment 1 the 
participants could predict what action they were about to see in each trial, in Experiment 2 
this prediction was not available to them. 
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen healthy paid student volunteers participated in Experiment 1. The data from 
15 participants were included in the current analyses (mean age: 22 years, range: 18 to 27 
years). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to excessive blinking artifacts, 
which contaminated more than 50% of the trials. Eighteen volunteers participated in 
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Experiment 2. The final sample consisted of 16 participants (mean age: 22 years, range: 19 to 
25 years). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to excessive blinking, and 
another one due to sweat artifacts, which contaminated more than 50% of the trials. All 
participants were healthy, right-handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision (as 
established using verbal reports). All gave written informed consent to participate in the 
current research prior to the experimental session. The experiments were approved by the 
local ethical committee.
2.2. Stimuli and Apparatus
Participants sat in a sound-proof electrically shielded EEG booth at a viewing 
distance of approximately 80 cm from a 24-in. LCD computer screen (60 Hz refresh rate, 
1920 x 1080 px resolution), with a response pad in their hands. Two loudspeakers positioned 
side by side behind the screen were used to deliver auditory stimuli.
Visual stimuli were video clips depicting a human hand performing one of the three 
object-directed actions: (1) grasping an object, (2) reaching for an object without grasping it, 
and (3) pointing to an object with the extended index finger (example clips are available in 
the Supplementary Material). All the clips had the same structure and timing: first, the object 
was presented in isolation in the center of a dark surface (1150 ms), then the object was 
targeted by one of the three actions performed by a hand approaching it from the top of the 
display (1150 ms), and finally the outcome of the action was presented as a still frame (300 
ms), for a total trial length of 2600 ms (Figure 1). The hand made physical contact with the 
object only in the grasping condition, while it stopped before touching the object in the 
reaching and pointing conditions. The three types of actions were filmed separately. In the 
reaching condition, the actor was instructed to move her hand as if she was to grasp the 
object but could not stretch out her arm enough to touch it. In all clips the movement lasted 
!12
exactly 1150 ms, thus resulting in a slightly higher velocity of grasping over reaching and 
pointing actions due to the longer trajectory of movement when the actor had to touch the 
object. 
Fifteen purpose-made similar-sized objects novel to participants were used to record 
the clips. Clips were 960 x 540 px in size and were positioned in the center of the screen 
against a grey background, thus subtending approximately 12o of visual angle. A white 
fixation dot (5 x 5 px) was displayed in the center of the display. In each video clip, the action 
was preceded by one of the two types of auditory stimuli: a speech or a non-speech sound. 
The speech stimuli were three tokens of the phrase “Nézd csak!” (“Look!”) recorded by a 
female Hungarian native speaker. The non-speech stimuli were created by concatenating two 
pure tones matched in frequency and duration with constituent words of the respective speech 
stimuli (i.e., “nézd”, “csak”). The auditory stimuli started 50 ms after the onset of the clip and 
lasted from 650 to 677 ms. Each experimental trial comprised a baseline stimulus (800 to 
1200 ms, randomly determined), action video clip, and a blink stimulus (800 to 1500 ms, 
randomly determined). The baseline stimuli were rotating screen-saver like animations. The 
blink stimulus was a “most pislogj” (“blink now”) instruction displayed in the center of the 
screen against a grey background. It was administered to minimize contamination of the EEG 
signal by blink artifacts.
The video stimuli were created with Apple Final Cut Pro and the sound was edited 
using Praat (http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/). The stimuli presentation was administered 
using MATLAB 2014b with the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3 (http://psychtoolbox.org). 
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Fig. 1. Experimental design. (A) The time course of the stimuli. Within each trial, the baseline period was 
followed by a 2600 ms clip depicting a target action. The clips consisted of three phases: object presentation 
(1150 ms), object-directed action (1150 ms), outcome presentation (300 ms). (B) The experimental conditions 
and the outcomes of the three target actions. The onset of one of the three object-directed actions (grasping, 
reaching, or pointing) was preceded by a sound stimulus (speech or pure tone) delivered during the object 
presentation period. 
2.3. Design and Procedure
The study consisted of 6 experimental conditions (2 x 3) defined by combinations of 
communicative and non-communicative sounds (i.e., speech vs. pure tone) with video clips 
depicting grasping, reaching, and pointing actions. In Experiment 1, there were 6 types of 
experimental blocks, in which one type of action was paired with one type of sound (i.e., pure 
tone – grasping, pure tone – reaching, pure tone – pointing, speech – grasping, speech – 
reaching, speech – pointing). The sequence of 6 blocks was repeated 3 times (each time in a 
different order, randomly determined), for a total of 18 blocks. Each block comprised 20 
trials (total number of trials: 360). In Experiment 2, trials were blocked solely by sound, so 
that in each block participants saw 21 trials depicting grasping, reaching, and pointing actions 
(n = 7 trials per action type) intermixed with the constraint that the same action could not be 
presented more than twice in a row. In total, 18 blocks were administered (total number of 
trials: 378). 
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While viewing the object-direct actions, participants performed a cover task to 
maintain their concentration during the experimental session. Participants were instructed to 
count how many times a particular object appeared on the screen during the block. In each 
block, we presented clips featuring only 5 preselected objects (randomized). Before the block 
started participants were shown the picture of the target object (randomly chosen from the set 
of 5 objects). After the block ended, they had to enter the response (forced choice between 
three options: 3, 4, or 5). The objects appeared with different prefixed frequency (in 
Experiment 1: 2 objects were presented on 3 and 5 trials, respectively, and 3 remaining 
objects were presented on 4 trials each; in Experiment 2: 1 object was presented on 3 trials, 2 
objects were presented on 4 trials each, and 2 remaining objects were presented on 5 trials 
each). The frequency of appearance of the target object was random with the constraint that it 
could not be the same on more than two consecutive blocks.
Participants were presented with written and verbal instructions to remain still and 
maintain their gaze on the centrally displayed fixation point to eliminate artifacts due to 
movement and saccades. They were also instructed to blink only when the blink stimulus was 
presented on the screen. Prior to the start of the experimental blocks, participants completed 5 
silent training trials.
2.4. EEG Acquisition and Analysis
The continuous EEG was acquired using HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Nets composed 
of 128 Ag/AgCl sensors (Electrical Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR, USA). Recordings were 
referenced to the vertex (Cz in the 10-20 system). The ground electrode was at the rear of the 
head (between Cz and Pz). The data were low-pass filtered online during the amplification 
process at 200 Hz and digitized with 500 Hz sampling rate. Impedances were kept below 40 
KΩ.
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The continuous EEG was segmented from 1200 ms before to 3200 ms after the onset 
of the visual stimulus (i.e., action clip). Only segments with the voltage range lower than 70 
μV within a sliding window of 80 ms and without ocular artifacts (saccades: voltage 
exceeding 55 μV, eye blinks: voltage exceeding 140 μV, at the horizontal EOG channels) 
were included in the analyses. Segments were excluded from the analyses if more than 10% 
of channels were contaminated by artifacts. Participants contributed on average 46 artifact-
free trials in Experiment 1 (median: 47, range: 21 to 59) and 48 artifact-free trials in 
Experiment 2 (median: 49, range: 14 to 63). There were no significant differences in the 
number of artifact-free trials across conditions. 
Following the interpolation of bad channels, the data were re-referenced to average 
reference. In order to assess mu suppression, we performed time-frequency analyses by 
applying a continuous wavelet transformation with Morlet wavelets for frequencies in 5-20 
Hz range with 1 Hz resolution. Then, the absolute value (i.e., the amplitude, and not the 
power) of the resulting complex coefficients was calculated (Csibra et al., 2000). Average 
event-related activation was computed for each participant by taking the mean across the 
trials for each experimental condition. To remove the distortion induced at the epoch edges 
by the wavelet convolution, 700 ms of the buffer data were removed at the beginning and at 
the end of each segment. The activation was baseline corrected by subtracting the average 
amplitude of the 500 ms prestimulus baseline from the whole epoch at each frequency. The 
time-frequency analysis was conducted in MATLAB 2014b using a package of custom-made 
scripts (WTools, see Parise & Csibra, 2013; EEGLAB, v. 13_4_3b). To assess mu 
suppression, we used two scalp regions located over sensorimotor cortices and selected 
around the C3 and C4 sites (e.g., Babiloni et al., 2002; Muthukumarswamy et al., 2004; 
Muthukumarswamy & Johnson, 2004). Each region comprised a cluster of 8 channels (left: 
30, 31, 36, 37, 41, 42, 53, 54; right: 79, 80, 86, 87, 93, 103, 104, 105). The average activity in 
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the alpha range (8-12 Hz) was computed for these two regions in the 1400-2300 ms time 
window, corresponding to the interval when the action was executed. Although the first frame 
when the hand appeared on the screen was at 1150 ms after the stimulus onset, we decided to 
shift the beginning of the time window of analysis due to the distortion in the signal created 
by the wavelet computation (i.e., around 250 ms at 8 Hz).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results 
Participants tracked the target objects with high accuracy, providing 90% correct 
responses in Experiment 1 (SD = 6%) and 91% in Experiment 2 (SD = 6%). In neither of the 
two experiments was their performance was affected by the type of block (Experiment 1: 
F(5,70) = 1.000, p = .424; Experiment 2: t(15) = 0.735, p = .474).
3.2. Electrophysiological results
3.2.1. Experiment 1. Sensorimotor alpha responses are shown on Figure 2A. Mu 
suppression was analyzed in a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with hemisphere (left 
vs. right), sound (speech vs. pure sound), and action (grasping vs. reaching vs. pointing) as 
within-subject factors. This analysis yielded a significant interaction between sound and 
action, F(2,28) = 4.052, p = .046. Follow-up paired-samples t tests revealed that this 
interaction was due to the fact that there was a significant difference between pure tone and 
sound conditions only during the observation of grasping, t(14) = 2.282, p = .039, d = 0.534 
but not during the observation of reaching, t(14) = 1.245, p = .233, or pointing, t(14) = 1.024, 
p = .323. A separate series of one-sample t tests found that only the mu suppression recorded 
during the observation of grasping preceded by pure tone sounds was significantly different 
from baseline, t(14) = 2.191, p = .046.
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Fig. 2. Summary of the EEG results. (A) Experiment 1, (B) Experiment 2. The time frequency-plots represent 
the changes in the oscillatory activity (3-20 Hz) during the action observation recorded over C3 and C4 sites. 
The time-frequency plots show baseline-corrected activity averaged across all participants as a function of the 
observed action (grasping, reaching, or pointing) and the sound preceding the onset of the action (pure tone or 
speech). The zero point represents the beginning of the experimental trial. The black squares indicate the time-
frequency window used for the analysis of the mu suppression. The bar plots represent the mean amplitude of 
the oscillatory activity during the window of analysis. Error bars represent SEM. 	
These results indicate that participants recruited their sensorimotor system (as indexed 
by mu suppression from baseline to action observation period) only while observing actions 
that could be unambiguously interpreted as instrumental (i.e., grasping preceded by pure tone 
sounds). When the context suggested a referential interpretation of the observed action, either 
due to the semantics of the witnessed gestures (i.e., pointing) or to the presence of speech, 
there was no sign of significant motor activation. This pattern of results suggests that action 
interpretation is not dependent on the observer's motor system and that the presence of 
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subsequent motor activation is conditioned by this interpretation: only conceiving of an 
action as instrumental, but not as referential, leads to the recruitment of sensorimotor cortices 
during action observation.
3.2.2. Experiment 2. Sensorimotor alpha responses are shown on Figure 2B. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with hemisphere (left vs. right), sound (speech vs. pure sound), 
action (grasping vs. reaching vs. pointing) on mu suppression revealed a significant 
interaction between sound and action, F(2,30) = 3.746, p = .035. This interaction was driven 
by the activation during the observation of grasping actions: there was significantly more 
suppression when grasping was preceded by speech than when it was preceded by pure tones, 
t(15) = 2.377, p = .031, d = 0.36. The exposure to different types of sound did not lead to 
significant differences when participants observed reaching, t(15) = .162, p = .874, or 
pointing, t(15) = .519, p = .612. Only when grasping actions followed pure tones, the 
activation during action observation was significantly different from the activation recorded 
during baseline period, t(15) = 2.313, p = .035.
This pattern of results mirrors that of Experiment 1, thus providing additional 
evidence that the involvement of sensorimotor cortices during action observation was 
conditional on the interpretation of the observed action as instrumental. In order to prevent 
participants from pre-activating action interpretation mechanisms before they were exposed 
to the action to be interpreted, in Experiment 2 the trials were blocked solely by sound type, 
and not by both sound and action type as in Experiment 1. The fact that we found the same 
results suggests that action anticipation is not necessary for the mu suppression response to 
build up.
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4. Discussion
Despite numerous reports of motor mirroring in the observer’s brain during the 
observation of actions performed by others, it remained unclear whether and to what extent 
this mirroring mechanism contributes to the understanding of observed actions. Two opposite 
views on its functional significance have emerged in the literature: the mirror-based account 
of action understanding proposes that the recruitment of the observer’s motor system is a 
precondition of action understanding, while the action reconstruction and the social 
responding accounts argue that motor mirroring is one of the outcomes of action 
understanding. Here, we put these competing accounts to the test using an action-observation 
task, measuring motor mirroring by the modulation of the sensorimotor alpha-band EEG 
activity (i.e., mu suppression). 
Across two experiments, participants displayed the activation of their motor system, 
as indexed by mu suppression, in response to viewing grasping actions, but not in response to 
viewing pointing or reaching actions. Besides sharing the same formal characteristics (i.e., 
transitivity, object-directedness) that were previously shown to elicit higher levels motor 
mirroring than intransitive actions not involving objects (e.g., Nishitani & Hari, 2000), all 
presented actions were part of the motor repertoire of human adults and were familiar to the 
participants. Therefore, the recorded differences in the motor activity could not stem from 
differences in the structural description of the presented actions (e.g., whether a particular 
hand movement targets an object or not), availability of corresponding motor representations, 
or inaccessibility of relevant action interpretations. The fact that motor activation was only 
observed under circumstances that normally result in a particular interpretation of the 
observed behaviors (i.e., instrumental rather than referential) indicates that the activation of 
the motor system follows in time, and is modulated by, the observers’ interpretation of 
ongoing actions. The proposal that action interpretation is achieved through mechanisms that 
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directly and automatically match observed movements with the observer’s own motor 
representations is inconsistent with the current findings.
The fact that the observation of pointing, a conventionalized communicative act, did 
not result in increased mu suppression (as compared to baseline) is in line with the idea that 
the interpretation of communicative acts does not involve the emulation of hypothesized 
action goals (or end states) in the observer’s motor system. Rather, in communicative 
contexts the observer’s cognitive resources are focused on identifying and processing those 
aspects of the world that are potential referents of the actor’s communicative intention, which 
does not directly engage the motor circuitry. 
Furthermore, the motor activation elicited by the observation of grasping actions was 
modified by the presence of a communicative signal before the onset of the action. 
Specifically, mu suppression was observed in response to grasping actions that were preceded 
by pure tones, but not in response to identical grasping actions were preceded by participant-
directed speech (i.e., Look!). This finding suggests that the ostensive nature of the auditory 
speech signal changed the interpretation of the observed grasping action: the instrumental 
interpretation that is normally triggered by this action was withdrawn or suppressed. It is 
likely that this withdrawal of instrumental interpretation was due to the generation of a 
different interpretation: the communicative context induced the expectation for referential 
signals rather than for an instrumental action (Csibra, 2010). Crucially, grasping an object 
could indeed be the first step of picking up and showing the object to the observer, in which 
case the object would play the role of the referent of a communicative exchange rather than 
the target of an instrumental action (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998). Similarly, the fact that motor 
activation was not elicited by the observation of reaching actions indicates that reaching in 
the current context was not construed as goal-directed. Although we did not predict this 
finding, it can be explained given the pragmatics of the current experimental situation: the 
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fact that the hand would repeatedly stop short of the object could have made the action 
uninterpretable in terms of its underlying goals.
At first, our conclusion that motor activation is not elicited, or at least that it is 
attenuated, in response to the observation of communicative actions may be seen as 
contradicting an earlier finding that reported different modulation of alpha-band oscillatory 
activation when the actor faced the participants compared to when he was viewed from 
behind (Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006). An action in front view with implied eye contact 
could indeed indicate potential social interaction via non-verbal communication. However, 
two aspects of the results reported by Kilner et al. (2006) suggest that the reported effect was 
not related to motor mirroring. First, the modulation of alpha-band oscillatory activity was 
identified over the posterior parietal cortex, not over sensorimotor areas where mu 
suppression is usually found during execution or observation of actions (Babiloni et al., 
2002). Second, the magnitude of alpha-attenuation was not different between ‘facing’ and 
‘away’ action; rather, action direction (left vs. right) modulated the hemispheric activity 
differently only in the ‘facing’ condition. This pattern of results suggests that the orientation 
of the observed actor had an effect not on the motor system of the observers but on their 
spatial attention, and Kilner et al. (2006) arrived at a similar conclusion. 
Since early infancy, humans are able to determine when they are addressed by 
communication (Grossman et al., 2008; Senju & Csibra, 2008). This achievement is partly 
due to sensitivity to a set of specialized signals, such as speech, eye contact and contingent 
responsiveness to others’ actions (Csibra, 2010), that unambiguously indicate that subsequent 
actions are intended to be communicative (i.e., ostensive signals, after Sperber & Wilson, 
1986). Given that human communication employs a variety of channels and means, and that 
most object-direct actions can be performed with a communicative aim (e.g., tool-use 
demonstration instead of instrumental tool use), addressees should be ready to extend 
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referential action interpretation to any behavior that is accompanied by ostensive signals. In 
the current study, the withdrawal of instrumental interpretation of observed grasping actions 
was triggered by the presence of speech, but other ostensive signals should be functionally 
equivalent to speech in modulating action interpretation.
Our data provides evidence that processing of actions that are not interpreted as goal-
directed might not induce motor stimulation. However, the idea that the interpretation of 
instrumental actions might be also causally independent from motor resonance has been 
recently corroborated by findings from patients with limb dysplasia, a condition wherein 
upper limbs are absent or severely shortened. Vannuscorps and Camarazza (2016) 
demonstrated that these individuals could efficiently recognize and anticipate various upper 
limb actions despite the lack of motor representations and motor programs necessary to 
simulate the limb movements required to perform them. Furthermore, while watching hand 
actions aplasic patients born without hands displayed motor activation in the feet and/or 
mouth areas that corresponded to the effectors they would use to achieve the same goals (e.g., 
to grasp a container, Gazzola et al., 2007). Thus, motor activation here was the result of, 
rather than a contributor to, goal identification.
What neural mechanisms underlie action interpretation? The ability to interpret 
behaviors of others is supported by computations that take place outside of the motor system. 
For example, traditional cognitive models of action understanding propose that action 
interpretation is generated in two phases: observed movements are first analyzed in the 
observer’s visual system, and then fed directly into a praxis conceptual system that assigns 
meaning to them (Rothi et al., 1991). It has been also suggested that action processing might 
rely exclusively on visual processing implemented in hierarchical feedforward architectures 
(Giese & Poggio, 2003). However, our findings cannot be fully explained within a strictly 
feedforward framework. The fact that the interpretation of grasping actions differed 
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depending on the presence of speech implies that not only the characteristics of the visual 
stimuli, but also the context of the action execution contributed to its interpretation. This 
implies that human action interpretation abilities cannot be based exclusively on stimulus-
driven processes, and that action cognition relies to some extent on expectations derived from 
long-term conceptual knowledge (for convergent evidence suggesting that contextual 
information facilitates action recognition, see Wurm & Schubotz, 2012, 2016). 
Although the question of neural substrates of such top-down influences remains open, 
recent studies have provided evidence supporting claims about abstract action analysis 
outside of the human motor system. Wurm and Lingau (2015) demonstrated that abstract 
action representations (e.g., OPEN) that generalize across different object categories (e.g., 
open a bottle, open a box) and across different perceptually distinct objects within a given 
category (e.g., open this small bottle, open that large bottle, etc.) are instantiated in parietal 
and occipitotemporal cortices. In contrast, premotor cortices represent low-level features 
idiosyncratic to specific instantiations of an observed action.
One important question to be addressed in the light of the current results is what 
cognitive consequences follow from adopting a particular interpretative stance towards 
observed behaviors. In particular, to what extent are different types of action interpretations 
influenced by object representation and conceptualization? Regarding object representation, 
studies suggest that different information about objects is stored in the working memory 
depending on whether they were targeted by an action interpreted as instrumental or 
referential (Marno et al., 2014; Yoon et al., 2008). For example, preverbal infants are more 
likely to remember the location of a toy in an instrumental context, while in a referential 
context they preferentially store the information about its appearance (Yoon et al., 2008). 
Marno and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that such representational biases continue to 
shape working memory object representations in adulthood. It is less clear, however, whether 
!24
action interpretation also shapes the way in which objects are conceptualized. For example, it 
is possible that objects picked out through referential actions are construed as referents of the 
subsequent communication, while no such interpretation is attributed to objects selected 
through instrumental actions. Such interpretative strategy could considerably constrain infant 
word learning: infants could more easily learn new words for objects introduced in referential 
rather than in instrumental contexts (Pomiechowska & Csibra, 2016). 
In sum, we have provided evidence that motor activation in the observer’s brain is 
present when witnessed movements are construed as instrumental, and that such activation is 
absent when they are conceived as communicative, implicating that the involvement of motor 
system in action processing is not a prerequisite but a result of action interpretation. The two 
action interpretation systems that represent object-directed actions as instrumental and 
referential, respectively, are operational already in early childhood, support action 
interpretation in adulthood, and are likely to be implemented in distinct neural mechanisms. 
Our findings challenge the widely received view that motor resonance, or simulation of the 
observed movements in the observer’s own motor system, is crucial to action understanding. 
The fact that action interpretation flexibly changes depending on the presence of ostensive 
communicative signals implies that action processing mechanisms make use of both bottom-
up and top-down mechanisms. The neural architecture of such action processing system 
should be elucidated by further research.
Acknowledgements
We thank Zsuzsanna Karap for the help with data acquisition and Johannes Mahr for 
comments on the manuscript. This research was funded by a European Research Council 
Advanced-Investigator Grant (249519 OSTREFCOM).
!25
References
Andric, M., Solodkin, A., Buccino, G., Goldin-Meadow, S., Rizzolatti, G., & Small, S. L. 
(2013). Brain function overlaps when people observe emblems, speech, and grasping. 
Neuropsychologia, 51, 1619-1629.
Arnstein, D., Cui, F., Keysers, C., Maurits, N. M., & Gazzola, V. (2011). μ-suppression 
during action observation and execution correlates with BOLD in dorsal premotor, 
inferior parietal, and SI cortices. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 14243-14249.
Babiloni, C., Babiloni, F., Carducci, F., Cincotti, F., Cocozza, G., Del Percio, C., ... & 
Rossini, P. M. (2002). Human cortical electroencephalography (EEG) rhythms during 
the observation of simple aimless movements: a high-resolution EEG study. 
Neuroimage, 17, 559-572.
Babiloni, C., Carducci, F., Cincotti, F., Rossini, P. M., Neuper, C., Pfurtscheller, G., & 
Babiloni, F. (1999). Human movement-related potentials vs desynchronization of EEG 
alpha rhythm: a high-resolution EEG study. Neuroimage, 10, 658-665.
Begliomini, C., Wall, M. B., Smith, A. T., & Castiello, U. (2007). Differential cortical activity 
for precision and whole-hand visually guided grasping in humans. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25, 1245-1252.
Buccino, G., Vogt, S., Ritzl, A., Fink, G. R., Zilles, K., Freund, H. J., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). 
Neural circuits underlying imitation learning of hand actions: an event-related fMRI 
study. Neuron, 42, 323-334.
Carnahan, H., Goodale, M. A., & Marteniuk, R. G. (1993). Grasping versus pointing and the 
differential use of visual feedback. Human Movement Science, 12, 219-234.
Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., Tomasello, M., Butterworth, G., & Moore, C. (1998). Social 
cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age. 
Monographs of the society for research in child development, i-174.
Castiello, U. (2001). The effects of abrupt onset of 2-D and 3-D distractors on prehension 
movements. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 63, 1014-1025.
Chaminade, T., Meary, D., Orliaguet, J. P., & Decety, J. (2001). Is perceptual anticipation a 
motor simulation? A PET study. NeuroReport, 12, 3669-3674.
Csibra, G. (2010). Recognizing communicative intentions in infancy. Mind & Language, 25, 
141-168.
Csibra, G. (2008). Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 
107, 705-717.
Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action interpretation: An alternative account. In: P. 
Haggard, Y. Rosetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensorimotor Foundations of Higher 
!26
Cognition. Attention and Performance XXII (pp. 435-459). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological and referential understanding of action in infancy. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 358, 
447-458.
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2007). ‘Obsessed with goals’: Functions and mechanisms of 
teleological interpretation of actions in humans. Acta psychologica, 124, 60-78.
Csibra, G., & Volein, A. (2008). Infants can infer the presence of hidden objects from 
referential gaze information. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 26, 1-11.
Csibra, G., Bıró, S., Koós, O., & Gergely, G. (2003). One-year-old infants use teleological 
representations of actions productively. Cognitive Science, 27, 111-133.
Csibra, G., Davis, G., Spratling, M. W., & Johnson, M. H. (2000). Gamma oscillations and 
object processing in the infant brain. Science, 290, 1582-1585.
Csibra, G., Gergely, G., Bı́ró, S., Koos, O., & Brockbank, M. (1999). Goal attribution without 
agency cues: the perception of ‘pure reason’in infancy. Cognition, 72, 237-267.
Daum, M. M., Prinz, W., & Aschersleben, G. (2008). Encoding the goal of an object-directed 
but uncompleted reaching action in 6-and 9-month-old infants. Developmental Science, 
11, 607-619.
Dennett, D. C. 1987 The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding 
motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental brain research, 91, 176-180.
Elsner, B. (2007). Infants’ imitation of goal-directed actions: The role of movements and 
action effects. Acta psychologica, 124, 44-59.
Ehrsson, H. H., Fagergren, A., Jonsson, T., Westling, G., Johansson, R. S., & Forssberg, H. 
(2000). Cortical activity in precision-versus power-grip tasks: an fMRI study. Journal 
of neurophysiology, 83, 528-536.
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social 
cognition. Trends in cognitive sciences, 8, 396-403.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the 
premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593-609.
Gazzola, V., van der Worp, H., Mulder, T., Wicker, B., Rizzolatti, G., & Keysers, C. (2007). 
Aplasics born without hands mirror the goal of hand actions with their feet. Current 
biology, 17, 1235-1240.
!27
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naıve theory of 
rational action. Trends in cognitive sciences, 7, 287-292.
Grafton, S. T., Arbib, M. A., Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Localization of grasp 
representations in humans by positron emission tomography. Experimental brain 
research, 112, 103-111.
Jacob, P., & Gergely, G. (2012). Reasoning about instrumental and communicative agency in 
human infancy. Rational constructivism in cognitive development, 59-94.
Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Bíró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 
months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193.
Giese, M. A., & Poggio, T. (2003). Neural mechanisms for the recognition of biological 
movements. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 179-192.
Gliga, T., & Csibra, G. (2009). One-year-old infants appreciate the referential nature of 
deictic gestures and words. Psychological Science, 20, 347-353.
Gredebäck, G., Fikke, L., & Melinder, A. (2010). The development of joint visual attention: a 
longitudinal study of gaze following during interactions with mothers and strangers. 
Developmental science, 13, 839-848.
Grèzes, J., Armony, J. L., Rowe, J., & Passingham, R. E. (2003). Activations related to 
“mirror” and “canonical” neurones in the human brain: an fMRI study. Neuroimage, 18, 
928-937.
Grossmann, T., Johnson, M. H., Lloyd-Fox, S., Blasi, A., Deligianni, F., Elwell, C., & Csibra, 
G. (2008). Early cortical specialization for face-to-face communication in human 
infants. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 275, 
2803-2811.
Hari, R., & Salmelin, R. (1997). Human cortical oscillations: a neuromagnetic view through 
the skull. Trends in neurosciences, 20, 44-49.
Hari, R., Forss, N., Avikainen, S., Kirveskari, E., Salenius, S., & Rizzolatti, G. (1998). 
Activation of human primary motor cortex during action observation: a neuromagnetic 
study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95, 15061-15065.
Hickok, G. (2013). Do mirror neurons subserve action understanding?. Neuroscience letters, 
540, 56-58.
Jacob, P. (2008). The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience. 
Perception, 37, 446-461.
Johnson-Frey, S. H., Maloof, F. R., Newman-Norlund, R., Farrer, C., Inati, S., & Grafton, S. 
T. (2003). Actions or hand-object interactions? Human inferior frontal cortex and action 
observation. Neuron, 39, 1053-1058.
!28
Keller, G. B., & Hahnloser, R. H. (2009). Neural processing of auditory feedback during 
vocal practice in a songbird. Nature, 457, 187-190.
Kilner, J. M., Marchant, J. L., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Modulation of the mirror system by 
social relevance. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 1, 143-148.
Kita, S. (Ed.). (2008). Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition meet. Psychology 
Press.
Marno, H., Davelaar, E. J., & Csibra, G. (2014). Nonverbal communicative signals modulate 
attention to object properties. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 40, 752.
Marteniuk, R. G., MacKenzie, C. L., Jeannerod, M., Athenes, S., & Dugas, C. (1987). 
Constraints on human arm movement trajectories. Canadian Journal of Psychology/
Revue canadienne de psychologie, 41, 365.
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., & Johnson, B. W. (2004). Changes in rolandic mu rhythm during 
observation of a precision grip. Psychophysiology, 41, 152-156.
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., Johnson, B. W., & McNair, N. A. (2004). Mu rhythm modulation 
during observation of an object-directed grasp. Cognitive Brain Research, 19, 195-201.
Nishitani, N., & Hari, R. (2000). Temporal dynamics of cortical representation for action. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 97, 913-918.
Parise, E., & Csibra, G. (2013). Neural responses to multimodal ostensive signals in 5-month-
old infants. PloS one, 8, e72360.
Pierno, A. C., Tubaldi, F., Turella, L., Grossi, P., Barachino, L., Gallo, P., & Castiello, U. 
(2009). Neurofunctional modulation of brain regions by the observation of pointing and 
grasping actions. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 367-374.
Pomiechowska, B. & Csibra, G. (2016). Referential understanding of pointing actions and its 
consequences for object representation. International Conference on Infant Studies, 
New Orleans, LA, US.
Prather, J. F., Peters, S., Nowicki, S., & Mooney, R. (2008). Precise auditory–vocal mirroring 
in neurons for learned vocal communication. Nature, 451, 305-310.
Prinz, W. (2006). What re-enactment earns us. Cortex, 42, 515-517.
Sinigaglia, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2011). Through the looking glass: Self and others. 
Consciousness and cognition, 20, 64-74.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying 
the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 661-670.
!29
Gonzalez Rothi, L. J., Ochipa, C., & Heilman, K. M. (1991). A cognitive neuropsychological 
model of limb praxis. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 8, 443-458.
Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2008). Gaze following in human infants depends on communicative 
signals. Current Biology, 18, 668-671.
Skerry, A. E., Carey, S. E., & Spelke, E. S. (2013). First-person action experience reveals 
sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 110, 18728-18733.
Southgate, V., & Csibra, G. (2009). Inferring the outcome of an ongoing novel action at 13 
months. Developmental psychology, 45, 1794.
Southgate, V., Johnson, M. H., El Karoui, I., & Csibra, G. (2010). Motor system activation 
reveals infants’ on-line prediction of others’ goals. Psychological Science.
Southgate, V., Johnson, M. H., Osborne, T., & Csibra, G. (2009). Predictive motor activation 
during action observation in human infants. Biology Letters, rsbl20090474.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986).  Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Second 
Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Umilta, M. A., Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(2001). I know what you are doing: A neurophysiological study. Neuron, 31, 155-165.
Vannuscorps, G., & Caramazza, A. (2016). Typical action perception and interpretation 
without motor simulation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113, 
86-91.
Wagner, L., & Carey, S. (2005). 12-month-old infants represent probable endings of motion 
events. Infancy, 7, 73-83.
Woodward, A. L. (2009). Infants' grasp of others' intentions. Current directions in 
psychological science, 18, 53-57.
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. 
Cognition, 69, 1-34.
Wurm, M. F., & Lingnau, A. (2015). Decoding actions at different levels of abstraction. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 35, 7727-7735.
Wurm, M. F., & Schubotz, R. I. (2016). What’s she doing in the kitchen? Context helps when 
actions are hard to recognize. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1-7.
Wurm, M. F., & Schubotz, R. I. (2012). Squeezing lemons in the bathroom: contextual 
information modulates action recognition. Neuroimage, 59, 1551-1559.
Yoon, J. M., Johnson, M. H., & Csibra, G. (2008). Communication-induced memory biases in 
preverbal infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 13690-13695.
